PART TWO

Theories and Politics of Language
The debate surrounding Tokieda Motoki’s Language Process Theory (gengo katei setsu) and more particularly Tokieda’s critique of Saussure dominated metatheoretic discourse in the fields of kokugogaku (national language studies) and gengogaku (linguistics) in the immediate postwar period.¹ The debate is perhaps best known within these disciplines as a kind of territorial polemic typified by Hattori Shirō’s attack on Tokieda’s reading of Saussure.² Hattori’s attack was preceded by the kokugogakusha Satō Kiyoji’s critique of Language Process Theory.³ In general, Tokieda’s work produced a complex of responses from both the kokugogaku and gengogaku establishments.

In the last several decades, scholars of Japanese literature have revived interest in Tokieda’s writing about language.⁴ I am interested in the relative lack of contact between this discourse, arising from literary theoretical writing, and the earlier (but ongoing) debate in kokugogaku and gengogaku. The more recent discourse highlights Tokieda as a “homegrown theorist,” to adopt Kamei Hideo’s term.⁵ This chapter is an attempt to relate the two discourses. It focuses on two sources of potential tension in Tokieda’s thought. The first is the tension between Tokieda’s theory of kokugo (national language) and the universalizing aspects of his theory of language. The second

is the tension in Language Process Theory between rejecting objectification of language, on the one hand, and the objectified aspects of Tokieda’s grammatical description on the other.

1. LANGUAGE PROCESS THEORY

Kamei Hideo’s preface to the English translation of Transformsations of Sensibility contains an excellent summary of Language Process Theory. I will not attempt to duplicate it here. Instead, following Kamei’s lead, I present the synopsis of the theory provided by Miura Tsutomu. The text below (my translation) appears as the final section of Miura’s review of the history of Japanese language studies.

Tokieda Motoki’s Language Process Theory
The Shôwa period brought Tokieda Motoki’s introduction of his Language Process Theory and research on Japanese based on it. The significance of this event is comparable to the advent of Copernicus in astronomy; it demarcated a new era not just for kokugogaku but for gengogaku as well. The details of the theory are spelled out in Tokieda’s Kokugogaku genron [Principles of National Language Studies], published in 1941. Linguistics up to that point conceived of language as a tool. It was held that language is a tool existing in the head that is used to think and to communicate thought. This tool was explicated as a psychological object (seishinteki na jittai) and was referred to as a “linguistic system” (gengo) and “the material of language” (gengo no zairyô). Tokieda rejected this view of language as a fixed structure, or object, and argued instead that the essence of language should be understood in terms of the processual structure (kateitaki kôzô): object (taishô) → cognition (ninshiki) → expression (hyôgen). The resultant theory was called Language Process Theory (gengo katei setsu).

Language Process Theory is based on the view of language revealed in the history of earlier kokugogaku research in Japan, as well as my reflections on linguistic theory based on my empirical

research. It is hypothesized as a conceptual basis for scientific research on the national language; it represents my response to the question of what is the essence of language. . . . It is in processual structure that the most important questions of language research reside. (Tokieda, *Kokugogaku genron*)

Linguists (*gengogakusha*) were negative toward Tokieda’s theory; even among national language studies scholars (*kokugogakusha*) there were both positive and negative opinions. But regardless of who its author was, the birth of Language Process Theory can only be considered a historical inevitability. Conceiving the universe as a “composite of processes” rather than a composite of entities is the revolutionary contribution of Hegelian philosophy; this dialectical worldview is affirmed by contemporary science. The introduction of Language Process Theory signifies the advent of a dialectical conception of language. The force of the theory stems from two sources. As Tokieda himself states, one is the unadorned view of language held by earlier *kokugogaku* scholars; the second is the dialectical thinking included in “phenomenology” as espoused by European philosophers, who were absorbing the tradition of Hegelian philosophy. . . .

The points of Tokieda’s theory that are superior to previous theories are the following.

1. Treating language in terms of a processual structure.
2. Employing the distinction between objective expressions (*kyakkanteki hyōgen*) and subjective expressions (*shukanteki hyōgen*) as a basic classification of words.
3. Problematizing two distinct stances toward language: the subjective stance and the objective stance.

The following can be identified as defects of the theory.

1. Taking the essence of language to be “conceptual operation by the subject” (*shutai no gainen sayō*).
2. Taking “meaning” in language to be “the subject’s way of grasping” (*shutai no haaku no shikata*), that is, a semantic operation directed toward the object (*kyakutai ni taisuru imi sayō*).
3. Omitting recognition of the social conventions that accompany linguistic expressions and the intermediary process dependent on them.
The stance that takes cognition to be reflection (ninshiki o han’ei to miru tachiba) is not correctly carried through. Neither the distinction between expressions dealing with received reality and expressions dealing with imagination, nor the mutual relation between these two, is taken up.\(^8\)

Miura goes on to explain the basis for his criticisms in (1) and (2). He argues that Tokieda’s conception of linguistic meaning is fundamentally incoherent, that his “treatment of language in terms of process is correct, but it cannot therefore be concluded that language and linguistic activity are one and the same. Tokieda’s misconception of ‘meaning’ is a product of this confusion.”\(^9\)

As none among object → cognition → expression are “meaning,” “meaning” must be sought somewhere outside of them. At this point, Tokieda labels the very activity of the subject producing an expression, that is, the way in which the subject cognizes the object, as a “semantic operation” (imi sayô), and concludes that the activity of the speaker/writer is itself “meaning.” . . . Tokieda’s argument that objects cannot be taken to comprise “meaning” is correct, but his transfer of the locus of “meaning” from object to function is an error. “Meaning” must be understood not as function, but as a relation.\(^10\)

The third of Miura’s criticisms of Language Process theory has a Saussurean flavor. Defect 3 is reminiscent of Saussure’s insistence on language as a social fact (fait social, Kobayashi/Tokieda’s shakaiteki jijitsu). This conception is explicitly rejected by Tokieda, as we shall see below.\(^11\)

## 2. THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR RESPONSE

Both Kamei and Miura in the passage cited above characterize the response to Tokieda through the 1950s in disciplinary terms: linguists (gengogakusha)

---

10. Ibid., 88. Although there is a superficial resemblance here between Miura’s conception of meaning as relation and the structuralist view of meaning as a relationship of oppositions, the notion of “relation” at issue is completely different. The relevant relation for Miura is between the “process leading up to the creation” of speech sound or writing and the form of that item (88).
opposed, *kokugogakusha* divided, according to Miura. A starker disciplinary division is imposed by the view that writers were opposed to the extent that they adhered to the Western-derived discipline of linguistics. I think that this view oversimplifies the ways in which linguistics (and other “Western” writings) were/are used in Japanese intellectual life and also disempowers the users. Tokieda himself prominently cites the Danish linguist Otto Jespersen, an early critic of Saussure. Thus European linguistics was utilized by both sides in the Language Process Theory debate.

Kamei has also explicated the political basis of the critique of Tokieda from the explicitly Marxist Left. The critique from the *gengogaku* establishment had a somewhat different basis, although it is also fundamentally political, I believe. Hattori Shirô, like Tokieda a (somewhat younger) transfer from the continent to a position at Tokyo University (the Department of Linguistics in Hattori’s case), accuses Tokieda of relying on Kobayashi’s translation of Saussure and failing to understand the original text. Tokieda responded. I will not attempt to reproduce this debate here, but Hattori’s accusation has stuck in some measure. Thus, Kamei refers to Tokieda taking up Kobayashi’s translation of “Saussure’s definition of *langue*.” A sense of the effect of this polemical gambit against Tokieda can be derived from an informal reminiscence on the topic of Saussure and his reception in Japan written by Kobayashi.

Kobayashi Hideo’s translation of Bally and Sechehaye’s *Cours de linguistique générale* was the first translation of Saussure to appear in any language. Kobayashi’s article (written in 1977, toward the end of his life, for a special issue of *Gekkan gengo* devoted to Saussure) is a play on Kobayashi’s ambiguous position. Kobayashi was Tokieda’s colleague and interlocutor at Keijô University in Seoul starting in spring 1929; he was also the translator-author of the text that provided the basis for Tokieda’s “misreading” of Saussure.

Tokieda returned to Seoul in the fall of 1929 from his studies in Germany and, according to Kobayashi, began studying Saussure assiduously: “Our offices were close; nearly once or twice a week he would come to my office and launch the debate. The endpoint of the debate would without

---

12. Ibid., 144.
13. Hattori, “Gengo katei setsu ni tsuite”; Hattori, “Saussure no langue to gengo katei setsu,” Of course, we must remember that there is no original text. Kobayashi’s translation, like other “Saussures,” is based on the redaction of the notes of Saussure’s students produced by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye and published after Saussure’s death.
fail appear as an article. *Kokugogaku genron* is not, upon close inspection, a single unified piece of writing; it is rather a compendium of individual articles, each one the product of his debates with me.”  

Kobayashi resumes the “misreading” attack on Tokieda’s reading of Saussure, but the interest of his version is that he is the proximate author of the complicit text: “However, (Tokieda’s) understanding of Saussure was based for the most part on the impression he derived from reading the first few chapters of *Gengogaku genron*; it was certainly not based on a structural grasp of the work resulting from a thorough reading of the entire text. Although Tokieda was a graduate of Kōsei Middle School, by the time he graduated university the better part of his French was gone; for the most part it appears that his effort to absorb the linguistic theory of the Far West (*taisei no gengo gakusetsu*) was through the medium of my translation.”

The irony here is that Tokieda’s reading can only be as flawed as Kobayashi’s translation. The broader point is, of course, that the “accuracy” of the translation is irrelevant: “Saussurean” linguistics as engaged by Tokieda in the 1930s and 1940s was based on Kobayashi’s text, not on Bally and Sechehaye’s “original” redaction. But what was at issue for Kobayashi and Hattori, both *gengogakusha* in the conventional disciplinary sense? The emphasis on translation, on legitimate versus illegitimate appropriation of foreign texts, suggests that the issue was control of linguistic capital. The discussion of *gengogaku* versus *kokogogaku* in relation to Language Process Theory has focused on the supposed intellectual differences between these two disciplines, one objectivist and Western-derived, the other (ideally at least) subjectivist and “homegrown.” In fact, there is a more important material difference between the two disciplines, where the former might be represented by the career of Kobayashi Hideo. The social extension of “linguistics” is language workers: translators, language teachers, dictionary compilers. For this group, foreign language information is the capital that its members are normally privileged to control, and among their privileges is the primary right to neologize. Thus, while Kobayashi Hideo is virtually unknown as a linguistic theoretician, the impact of his coinages in *Gengogaku genron* on subsequent linguistic and literary theorizing is enormous. These include the following.

17. Ibid., 48.
18. Ibid., 48.
19. It is notable that these “technical” terms are to be found in Sanseidō’s French-Japanese dictionary, although terms such as *diachrony* and *signifier* are absent from its English counterpart. Maruyama Juntarō and Kawamoto Shigeo, *Konsaisu futsuwa jiten*, rev. ed. (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1958).
From the standpoint of Kobayashi, a specialist in stylistics in the tradition of Bally, or Hattori, perhaps the Japanese linguist best known in the West during the postwar period, Tokieda’s bold plunge into the domain of linguistic theorizing using neologized/translational technical vocabulary was a territorial intrusion. In fact, even sixty years after its publication one of the most striking aspects of *Kokugogaku genron* is the free use it makes of this vocabulary to directly challenge Western theorists (primarily, of course, Saussure). This is in contrast to the use of translational vocabulary in linguistic literature prior to Tokieda. While *kokugakusha* such as Ueda Kazutoshi and Yamada Yoshio made heavy use of linguistic technical terminology from translational sources (often negotiating between such terminology and terminology from Edo period *kokugaku* sources, as did Tokieda), these scholars did not engage in direct criticism of the intellectual sources of this terminology by naming sources and criticizing them. Thus, Kobayashi provides evidence that Hashimoto Shinkichi, Tokieda’s predecessor at Tokyo University, was influenced by *Gengogaku genron*, yet Saussure’s name does not appear in Hashimoto’s writings.20

*Kokugogaku genron* is truly revolutionary in its ambition to scrutinize the conceptual bases of the very terms of linguistic theorizing in their translational guise. I believe that this ambition is by far the most important legacy of Tokieda’s work, more important than his attempt to redefine the

---

20. Kobayashi, “Nihon ni okeru Saussure no eikyō,” 47. The practice of minimizing references to intellectual precursors and adversaries was during the first half of the twentieth century a hallmark of theoretical linguistic writing by linguists in the West as well. Saussure’s *Cours* itself is notable for its lack of such references. Of course, this may have something to do with the fact that it is based on lecture notes. The same may be said of Edward Sapir’s *Language* (1921) and Leonard Bloomfield’s book of the same title (1928), the foundational texts of American structuralism. It is not until Noam Chomsky’s *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965) that a style of citation polemic comparable to the norm in literary and philosophical writing appears in linguistic writing by linguists.
intension of the term *kokugo* or his rejection of objectifying conceptions of language. This ambition was an implicit threat to the masters of the translational domain, in this case linguists involved in the work of translating and interpreting texts such as Saussure’s *Cours*. One suspects that this is the political basis for critiques such as Hattori’s, which in this sense must be seen as counterattacks.

3. DEFINING KOKUGO

*Gengo katei setsu* is a universalizing theory, as pointed out by Kamei. It has no necessary identification with Japanese. The subsections of *Kokugogaku genron* discuss “The stance of linguistic research” “The object of linguistic research,” and “The subjective stance and the observational stance toward language,” all desiderata in a general theory of language. Tokieda’s definition of *kokugo* is subsequent to this universalistic theorizing, and it shows careful attention to internal consistency. Because Tokieda rejects the characterization of language as a *fait social* (*shakai* teki jijitsu), he is compelled to reject the standard sociohistorical definition of *kokugo* qua national language, which had become commonplace by the time *Kokugogaku genron* was written. Tokieda writes:

The term *kokugo* as used in national language studies (*kokugogaku*) and in the history of those studies (*kokugogakushi*) can be seen as synonymous with “Japanese” (*Nihongo*). In addition to this commonly used sense of *kokugo*, what is construed as the standard language or the common language of the nation is also called *kokugo*; this is the narrow sense of the term. Strictly speaking, it would be most appropriate to maintain just the narrow sense of the term and not to use the term *kokugo* for Japanese as a whole, but rather simply call it Japanese, and to use “Japanese linguistics” (*Nihongogaku*), “the history of Japanese linguistics” (*Nihongogakushi*) in the place of “national language studies” and “the history of national language studies,” but for the present, as a matter of convenience, I will follow established practice and continue to use the terms *kokugogaku* and *kokugogakushi*. Now, how should we define *kokugo*, that is to say, Japanese? I have rejected the previously established definition of *kokugo* as the language of the Japanese nation (*Nihon kokka no gengo*) or as the language of

the Japanese race (Nihon minzoku no gengo), and maintained instead that kokugo, that is to say, Japanese, is a language possessed of Japanese-like characteristics (Nihonteki seikaku o motta gengo).

There are two factors in Tokieda’s desire to redefine the term kokugo. First, as pointed out by Yasuda Toshiaki, after 1885, 1910, and 1937, the multilinguality of the Japanese empire vitiated the identification of kokugo as the language of—even an idealized—ethnically and linguistically homogeneous state as conceived by Ueda Kazutoshi and other Meiji period scholars. Second, as observed above, any definition of kokugo as the language spoken by a particular population would be an externalizing or socially based definition.

Tokieda follows the preceding passage with a discussion of his interpretation of how Saussure would define a particular language. According to Tokieda, under a Saussurean approach “Japanese could be considered one langue [in the original: gengo = rangu, the former written in Chinese characters, the latter in katakanal.” This is a part of Tokieda’s reading of Saussure that was criticized by Hattori because Saussure appears not to apply the concept of langue (language system) to particular languages in the everyday sense of that term. What concerns us most here is how Tokieda proceeds from his critique of Saussure to a processual definition of kokugo = Nihongo. He continues:

I would like to consider the concept of Japanese based on the conception of langue outlined above, as the sum total of unions of idea and acoustic image stored in the brain of individual speakers. Of course it is not the case each of us individuals knows and implements all of the vocabulary and all of the grammatical rules of Japanese (kokugo). Therefore one could hold that what we call Japanese (Nihongo) must be the sum total of each individual’s vocabulary and grammatical rules. The idea that langue exists outside of the individual follows from this. The way of thinking that looks at Japanese (Nihongo) in this kind of quantitative fashion and takes it to be the composite of the languages (gengo) of individuals follows inevitably from taking langue to be the union of idea and acoustic image; it follows from this way of thinking.

22. Here Tokieda is referring to his formulation of this definition of kokugo in a previous work, Tokieda Motoki, Kokugogakushi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940).
23. Tokieda, Kokugogaku genron, 143.
25. Tokieda, Kokugogaku genron, 144.
that each of us partakes of no more than a part of the Japanese language (Nihongo). Newspapers and novels and other texts that we see every day are no more than a part of the Japanese language. But is this way of thinking correct? If it is the case that one union of idea and acoustic image is langue and the composite of such unions is also langue and together they are actual objects (jitsuzaitai), it must naturally be the case that they stand in a part-whole relation. Then since what we can experience is no more than a part of Japanese (kokugo), and since we cannot grasp the sum total of Japanese (kokugo) in its entirety as an object, we are forced to arrive at the conclusion that national language studies (kokugogaku) simply cannot be constituted. But why is it that we believe that kokugogaku is possible dealing only with one portion of the Japanese language (kokugo)? When we consider why it is that a botanist can take an individual cherry blossom and still formulate a definition of cherry blossoms, we know that it is because the individual expresses the universal. That is, an individual cherry blossom is not a part of the entirety of cherry blossoms; rather it can be thought of as a representative of cherry blossoms in general. We cannot apply the preceding logic so long as we consider Japanese (Nihongo) the composite of the vocabulary of individuals. But why is it, as a matter of fact, that we can take a vocabulary item of a single individual, contrast it with the words of a foreign language, and recognize it to be a word of Japanese (Nihongo)? To explain this fact, we must discard the constructional view of language (kôseiteki gengokan) and adopt a processual view of language (kateiteki gengokan). So long as we view a word to be a constructional entity (kôseitai) formed from ideas and acoustic images, it will be difficult to produce criteria for distinguishing it as a word of Japanese (Nihongo) from another langue. We must seek Japanese-like special characteristics (Nihongoteki tokusei) in the psycho-physiological processes where they are actually expressed.  

Tokieda proceeds to provide concrete examples of the special characteristics in question.

Respect language (keigo) is said to have Japanese-like special characteristics, but if we were to consider respect language from a constructional viewpoint we would not be able to produce criteria for distinguishing it from other vocabulary. Only when we examine the special way of grasping the concept and expressing

26. Ibid., 144–46.
it can we consider respect language to have Japanese-like special characteristics. Likewise, in the sense that the foreign word *ink*, when realized as *inki* within the grammatical or phonetic system of Japanese (*kokugo*), is already imbued with Japanese-like characteristics, we are able to say that it has become Japanized (*kokugoka shita*).27

We see in the preceding two passages how Tokieda critiques Saussure’s “externalized” notion of *langue* and how he argues for a definition of *gengo* = *langue* = language in terms of process. However an epistemological problem arises when Tokieda attempts to implement this definition by identifying particular Japanese-like characteristics. As pointed out by Sakai, the project of identifying particular Japanese-like characteristics “requires an observational stance in which language is observed, analyzed, and known as an object rather than lived as a shutai-teki activity.”28 Thus, identification of the Japanese-like characteristics of *inki* requires attention to the external, formal characteristics of this lexical item. It also requires attention to the linguistic behavior of some social group; if *inki* was the idiosyncratic production of an individual speaker, we would not identify it as having Japanese-like characteristics. In this regard Tokieda’s decision to proceed to the “definition” of a particular language undermines the project of a subject-oriented, processual conception of language in general. I return to this problem in discussing Tokieda’s concept of *chinjutsu* (proposition) below.

4. THE POLITICS OF KOKUGO

We have seen how the imperative to identify Japanese-like characteristics moved Tokieda toward an observational stance, as pointed out by Sakai, in some measure undermining the project of building a subject-oriented theory of language. Tokieda’s definition of *kokugo* leads him to this epistemological problem; it does not lead him into the trap of naive ethnocentrism. That is, a superficial reader of Tokieda might be tempted to jump to the conclusion that he imputed a special value to Japanese-like characteristics of language, but this is not the case. Tokieda’s refusal to attribute any kind of superiority to the Japanese language as a consequence of its special characteristics is revealed in a 1944 *zadankai* on the subject of Japanese as the common language of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Tokieda’s exchange is with the phonetician Jinbō Kaku.

27. Ibid. 146.
Jinbō: A common language (kyōtsūgo), well, that’s a natural development, you know. Insofar as we’re talking about a common language, among the languages of East Asia, well, the best would be Japanese—from a linguistic standpoint as well, hasn’t a theory been established that says that?

Tokieda: I don’t believe there’s any need to think that. It is not because a language is good that it is given the status of common language; the natural momentum centered on Japanese in a political sense, or economically or culturally—that’s what makes a common language.29

Here Jinbō seems to be referring to a linguistic theory that attributes intrinsic superiority to Japanese, perhaps his (mis)assessment of Language Process Theory. But Tokieda refuses the gambit. The same refusal to attribute any special linguistic superiority to Japanese is clear in Tokieda’s comments on dialects and non-Japanese languages in the Japanese political sphere. This refusal is completely consistent with the universalistic aspect of Tokieda’s theorizing about language.

Tokieda’s linguistic universalism has encouraged scholars from literary studies to oppose the allegations from Tokieda’s critics that he was a supporter of the language policy of the colonial administration in Korea, particularly after 1940 when the administration moved to suppress the use and learning of Korean as part of a policy to supplant Korean with Japanese.

This debate comes into particularly sharp focus with Yasuda’s 1997 monograph, which can be read as an extended critique of Karatani Köjin’s assertion that “Tokieda was not an imperialist.”30 The basis for Karatani’s assertion is Tokieda’s opposition to the blatantly coercive language-planning measures instituted by the colonial government in the 1940s such as forcing Koreans to adopt Japanese surnames. It is difficult to tell how openly Tokieda opposed these measures in his position as professor in the Kokugogaku Department at Keijō University. Although Tokieda expresses reservations about such policies in a general way in a widely cited 1942 article many of the claims about his position toward language policy are based on postwar writings.31 Yasuda points, in contrast, to a 1943 article by Tokieda that appeared in the Seoul collaborationist journal Kokumin bungaku. In this article Tokieda advocates abandonment of the Korean language.

29. Quoted in Yasuda, Shokuminchi no naka no “Kokugogaku,” 129.
To frankly state my conclusion regarding this problem, I believe that the people of the peninsula should discard the Korean language and adopt Japanese (Chōsen o sutete kokugo ni kiitsu subeki de aru to omou). I think that they should proceed toward making Japanese [kokugo throughout this article] their mother tongue toward the goal of a linguistic habitus (gengo seikatsu) in which they are primary users of Japanese. At the present time the Korean language, due to the overwhelming impact of Chinese and Chinese characters, and contact with Japanese in modern times, has fallen into a state of extreme confusion and disunity, and it cannot necessarily be said that the linguistic habitus of the people of the peninsula is a happy one. The sole means of escape from this situation is to unify the linguistic practice (gengo seikatsu) with Japanese. The annexation of Korea, that great historical fact, will be truly brought to completion by an extension to linguistic habitus. Unification of the national language (kokugo töitsu) must be deemed a symbol of a unified nation, but unification toward Japanese for the people of the peninsula is a benefit of the most internal, most spiritual kind. Enabling them to escape from the practice of bilingualism and establish a unified linguistic habitus bestows on the people of the peninsula a benefit inferior to none. The adoption of Japanese as mother tongue (kokugo o bogoka suru) is by no means something that can be accomplished in a day, but I believe that all of those involved in Japanese language education should work as one toward this goal.32

Karatani assertion that “Tokieda was not an imperialist” is naively ahistorical to begin with, but Tokieda’s stance in the article cited by Yasuda makes it impossible to claim that the political consequence of Tokieda’s universalism was a kind of brave liberalism with regard to language policy. It is nevertheless the case that Tokieda’s theorizing about language was not “Japanocentric” in the manner often revealed in, for example, contemporary “Nihonjinron” writing.

5. CHINJUTSU AND THE DELINEATION OF JAPANESE-LIKE CHARACTERISTICS

Literary scholars writing on Tokieda have focused on his use of the distinction between shi (content morphemes) and ji (functional morphemes) and

other linguistic concepts derived in part from Edo period nativist scholars. I would like to conclude this essay by briefly discussing an aspect of Tokieda bunpō (grammar) that continues to draw more attention from kokugogaku theorists. This is the concept of chinjutsu, normally translated into English as “proposition.” My discussion is drawn from the recent detailed analysis of Tokieda’s chinjutsu-ron (theory of chinjutsu) and its precursors and successors by Onoe Keisuke.33

As Onoe explains, the grammatical term chinjutsu was introduced by the early-twentieth-century grammarian Yamada Yoshio. In Yamada’s system, chinjutsu is closely associated with the predicate of the clause, which is normally sentence-final in Japanese.34 Onoe explains, “Yamada used the expression chinjutsu suru to speak of completing the utterance and enouncing the sentence at the site of the predicate (jutsugo ni oite iikiri, soko de bun o nobeageru), but his usage of ‘chinjutsu’ is based on the everyday, normal meaning of the term; it cannot be called a special grammatical concept.”35 Although Yamada’s use of the term may be transparent from the standpoint of normal Japanese usage, it is poorly conveyed by the standard English translation of the term (teiyaku). Onoe goes on to explain how Tokieda redefined the term.

According to Tokieda’s view of grammar [e.g., Tokieda, Kokugogaku genron], the objective content expressed by content morphemes (shi ni yotte arawasareta kyakutaiteki naiyō) is enclosed and unified by the subjective operation of sentence-final functional morphemes (bunmatsuji no shutaiteki sayō ga tsutsumi, tōitsu shite), and the sentence is constituted. But by asserting here that “What Professor Yamada calls ‘chinjutsu’ corresponds to my unifying operation of the clause-final functional morpheme,” Tokieda does not distinguish verbal Tokieda comes to label as chinjutsu the unifying function of the clause-final morpheme (bunmatsuji no tōitsu sayō) itself. Since then this has become established as Tokieda’s concept of chinjutsu and assumed the position of a fundamental concept in chinjutsuron.36 (Onoe, 283–84)

Onoe next explains the fundamental differences between Yamada’s concept of chinjutsu, which had an overt phonetic manifestation only in

---

35. Onoe, Bunpō to imi (I), 283.
36. Ibid., 283–84.
sentences with verbal/adjectival predication, and Tokieda’s, which was held to be manifest in every sentence of Japanese.

Tokieda does not distinguish verbal and nominal predication and understands the structure of all sentences in terms of the one-dimensional schema of \( \text{content material (shitaiteki sozai) + chinjutsu} \); chinjutsu at this point becomes greatly different from the chinjutsu of Yamada. For Yamada, all clauses were formed through an apperceptive operation (tôkaku sayô), and up to this point Tokieda’s chinjutsu is close to Yamada’s apperceptive operation, but Yamada’s apperceptive operation may be divided into cases in which it can be said to be realized in the grammatical form of the sentence (such as in the chinjutsu of the verbal/adjectival predicate in predicational clauses) and cases in which its presence may be recognized only abstractly. . . . Tokieda’s chinjutsu is, number one, realized in the morphology of all clauses, and, number two, specified as bearing the special function of clause-final functional morpheme; in these two respects it differs greatly from Yamada’s concept of chinjutsu,”\(^{37}\)

Tokieda’s conception of chinjutsu is expressed clearly in the following examples from *Kokugogaku genron*,\(^ {38}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Yama} & \text{ wa yuki } \text{ka} \\
\text{Soto} & \text{ wa ame rasi} \\
\text{Inu hashiru} & //
\end{align*}
\]

In structures such as *Inu hashiru* (A dog runs), where there is no pronounced clause-final functional morpheme, Tokieda posits a “zero chinjutsu” (reikigô no chinjutsu) to maintain the generalization that a clause-final chinjutsu is present in all sentences of Japanese. Chinjutsu in Tokieda’s sense might be best rendered as “mood” or, as Kinsui Satoshi has suggested, “propositional attitude.”\(^ {39}\)

This way of thinking about Japanese sentence structure has had enormous influence on most subsequent treatments of Japanese syntax, including those within the framework of generative grammar. Onoe outlines two objections to Tokieda’s chinjutsuron. The first focuses on the positing of a “zero chinjutsu” in an example such as *Inu hashiru*; it argues instead that it

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 284.

\(^{38}\) Tokieda, *Kokugogaku genron*, 252–53.

\(^{39}\) Kinsui Satoshi, personal communication, April 19, 2002.
is preferable to attribute some *ji*-like properties (and thus a contribution to *chinjutsu*) to the predicate (*hashiru* in the sentence *Inu hashiru*). The second kind of objection, which Onoe takes to be more serious, has to do with how *chinjutsu* status is assigned to auxiliaries (*jodôshi*) and sentence-final particles (*shûjoshi*). To take Onoe’s example, in a sentence such as *Ikanai* (Won’t go), the negative auxiliary *-nai* might be accorded *chinjutsu* status as the clause-final functional morpheme, but in the obviously related sentence *Ikanai yo* (Won’t go [you should know]) the same expression, *ikanai*, must be considered a content expression (*shi*) in its entirety, and only the sentence final particle *yo* qualifies as *chinjutsu*.

What is of interest about this discussion for this essay is not the validity of Tokieda’s conception of *chinjutsu* (although it is certainly worthwhile for literary scholars to know about this contribution to linguistic thought in Japan). More significant is the fact that the discussion is perforce conducted on the basis of the same observational stance as the grammatical theorizing of Yamada Yoshio and Watanabe Minoru (Tokieda’s major successor in *chinjutsuron*) and, indeed, Saussure. That is, distributional criteria, semantic interpretation, overt or nonovert realization—all the standard elements of linguistic analysis—determine the nature of the debate. This brings us full circle to Sakai’s point discussed in section 3. The concept of *chinjutsu* may be the most central of the “Japanese-like characteristics” on which Tokieda *bunpô* is built. But in developing this concept, and in its subsequent development in kokugogaku theory, the ideal of a nonobservational linguistic theory is irretrievably lost.