

Reportative evidentiality in Paraguayan Guaraní

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This talk explores the meaning of the Paraguayan Guaraní reportative evidential clitic =*ndaje*, based on corpus data and data collected in fieldwork, and compares its distribution and meaning to that of (reportative) evidential markers in e.g. St'át'imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007), Quechua (Faller 2002, 2007), Cheyenne (Murray 2010), and Tagalog (Schwager 2008, Kierstead 2012). The talk also discusses strategies for dealing with conflicting speaker judgments.

The meaning of atomic sentences with =*ndaje*: The clitic =*ndaje* (glossed '=SAY') is optional in Guaraní, and its absence does not imply direct evidence (unlike in e.g. Quechua, Faller 2002). Pablo's utterance in (1) implies both that the father is still working (the 'prejacent' implication, *p*) and that it was said that his father is still working (the 'reportative' implication, *ndaje(p)*). Evidence for the two implications is e.g. that (1) can be followed up with both the (Guaraní version of the) question 'Who said that?' and the question 'And when is he going to stop?'

- (1) Context: Pablo arrives at his parents' house. His father isn't there. Pablo tells his mother:

Che-rú=**ndaje** o-mba'apo guéteri.
my-father=SAY 3-work still

'It's said that my father is still working.'

In this talk, I present empirical evidence that utterances of atomic sentences with =*ndaje* are acceptable if the speaker has reportative evidence (secondhand, thirdhand or folklore) for an utterance that entails the prejacent, but not if s/he has direct evidence or evidence obtained by reasoning for the truth of the prejacent. I also show that the speaker must be committed to the truth of the evidential implication, but not to the truth of the prejacent, and can in fact believe the prejacent to be false or true, or have no opinion about its truth value. Crucially, utterances of sentences with =*ndaje* are acceptable in contexts where neither the prejacent nor the reportative implication are part of the common ground, which suggests that neither implication is a presupposition (contra e.g. Schwager 2008 on the Tagalog evidential *daw*, but see Kierstead 2012).

Syntactic embeddability of the reportative evidential: Cross-linguistically, evidentials differ in the extent to which they can occur in the syntactic scope of entailment-canceling operators, like negation, questions, modals and the antecedents of conditionals. Compared to evidentials in other languages, =*ndaje* is very embeddable, as consultants readily accept utterances where =*ndaje* is syntactically embedded under a modal, as in (2a), in the antecedent of a conditional, as in (2b), in a question, as in (2c), and under a verb of saying or a propositional attitude verb, as in (2d). Since =*ndaje* is a clitic, and sentential negation is expressed in Guaraní with a circumfix, =*ndaje* cannot syntactically embed under negation, as shown in (2e). The translations of the examples in (2a-e) and the respective logical forms correspond to meanings of the Guaraní examples all three of the consultants I have worked with on the reportative evidential agree on (as will be shown in the talk by presenting acceptability judgments for such utterances in a variety of discourse contexts).

- (2) a. I-katu o-manó=**ndaje** Pedro.
3-possible 3-die=SAY Pedro

'It is said that it's possible that Pedro will die.'

(Logical form: *ndaje*(possible(Pedro will die)))

- b. [It is said that the cricket used to be a young, white woman with a beautiful voice.]

Sapy'ánte mombyry-gua o-hendú-ramo=**ndaje** chupe i-jurujái o-pytá-vo.
suddenly far-from 3-hear-if=SAY her 3-wonder 3-stay-AT

'It is said that if somebody heard her from far away, they stayed with mouth open.' (slightly modified from Acosta and de Canese 2003:54f.)

(Logical form: *ndaje*(if(somebody heard her)(they stayed with mouth open)))

- c. Mba'é=pa=**ndaje** o-jehu fiésta-pe?
 what=QU=SAY 3-happen party-at
 'What is said happened at the party?'
 (Logical form: $qu_x(ndaje(x \text{ happened at the party}))$)
- d. Na-i-porã-i che-pan dúlse=**ndaje** o-poro-mbo-py'a-hasy.
 NEG-3-GOOD-NEG my-bread sweet=SAY 3-all-CAUS-stomach-sick
 'It's not good that it is said that my sweets cause people stomach ache'
 (Logical form: $it-is-not-good(ndaje(my \text{ sweets cause people stomach ache}))$)
- e. Nd-o-manó-i=**ndaje** Pédro. *Nd-o-manó=**ndaje**-i.
 NEG-3-die-NEG=SAY Pedro
 'It is is said that Pedro didn't die.' (Logical form: $ndaje(not(Pedro \text{ died}))$)

The meanings of utterances of complex sentences with =ndaje: The possible meanings of utterances of complex sentences with =ndaje that all three of my consultants agree on are summarized in Table 1: The first column gives the (abstract) logical forms of the three possible meanings, with *O* abbreviating the 'operator' (e.g. 'possible', 'if', etc.). A checkmark (✓) occurs in a cell if the complex sentence has the meaning (as illustrated in (2a-e)); a minus (–) occurs if it doesn't.

Meaning	Modal	Conditional	Question	Prop att	Negation
$ndaje(O(p))$	✓	✓	–	–	✓
$O(ndaje(p))$	–		✓	✓	–
$ndaje(p) \ \& \ O(p)$			–		–

Table 1: Possible and impossible meanings of complex sentences with =ndaje

In the talk, I present a formal semantic analysis of the empirical generalizations summarized in Table 1. The gist of the analysis is the following: **i)** =ndaje is a modifier of propositions, which accounts for its inability to modify questions (sets of propositions) or outscope the meaning of a propositional attitude verb, and accounts for the possibility of the meaning of a conditional to be its prejacent. **ii)** Since =ndaje must occur outside the negation circumfix, and it can be independently shown that only expressions inside the circumfix are in the scope of negation, the prejacent of =ndaje must include the meaning of negation in negated sentences. **iii)** =ndaje cannot occur under the scope of a modal since that would require the speaker to attribute to another epistemic agent the possibility of that agent having reportative evidence for the prejacent.

Conflicting native speaker judgments: Those cells in Table 1 that are left empty are those for which the three speakers I worked with gave conflicting judgments. In particular, while one speaker (A) systematically gave judgments that suggest that all of the empty cells in the table should be filled with checkmarks, the other two speakers (B, C) systematically gave judgments that suggest that all of the empty cells should be filled with minuses. The judgments for the last row of the table are of particular interest: according to speaker A, a projective interpretation of the reportative implication (i.e. where $ndaje(p)$ is not interpreted in the semantic scope of the operator *O* and *O* is not part of the prejacent) is possible for complex sentences where =ndaje occurs under a modal, in the antecedent of a conditional or under a propositional attitude verb (or a verb of saying). For speakers B and C, however, a projective interpretation is not possible. In the talk, I discuss several strategies for dealing with such conflicting judgments.

Selected references: • Faller, M. (2007). The Cusco Quechua reportative evidential and rhetorical relations, *Linguistische Berichte* 14, 223-252. • Kierstead, G. (2012) *Projective content and the Tagalog reportative*, Talk presented at the 2012 LSA meeting, Portland, OR. • Schwager, M. (2008) On what has been said in Tagalog: Reportative *daw*, in *Evidentiality*, 1-26, UBCWP.